Chinese Choices: A Poliheuristic Analysis of Foreign Policy Crises, 1950-1996.

Broad and complicated are the scope and themes of Chinese foreign policy. Most notably, China is seen widely as a unique power when dealing with international relations in general and foreign policy crises in particular. This paper uses the Poliheuristic Theory (PH), which incorporates both psychological and rational choice components in a synthesis of these previously isolated approaches, to explain decision-making in Chinese foreign policy crises. Taken from the authoritative compilation of International Crisis Behavior (ICB) Project, the nine cases in which China is a crisis actor span the period from 1950 to 1996. A controlled comparison of Chinese decision-making in times of crisis is used to test hypotheses derived from the PH. The hypotheses focus on how decisions are anticipated to occur over two stages. Principal expectations are that the noncompensatory rule, which places priority on political considerations, will determine viable alternatives at the first stage, while choices more in line with expected value maximization or lexicographic ordering will characterize the second stage. This study consists of seven sections. After a brief overview, PH is introduced as the theoretical foundation in the second section. The third section reviews the state of the art in studies of Chinese foreign policy-making. Fourth, a controlled comparative case analysis is outlined as the method, along with hypotheses derived from PH that will be tested via nine Chinese foreign policy crises identified by the ICB Project. The fifth section includes an account of the coding procedures for the cases. Sixth, results are presented that generally confirm PH. Implications regarding the differences and similarities of the cases also are discussed. Seventh, and finally, the concluding remarks review the results and identify directions for further research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]