Political Party Competition and Redistribution in the American States.

Enhanced political competition is a crucial element of the “resurgence of the states,” and many American states are significantly more competitive than they were a generation ago. What effects have these changes had on their political processes? Since V. O. Key examined the American South a half century ago, scholars have celebrated the positive effects of political party competition. Strategic politicians in competitive states are expected to mobilize new participants into politics, leading to more responsive outcomes. Furthermore, because these formerly passive citizens are generally of lower economic status than those who are already active, such mobilization is predicted to result in greater economic redistribution. A generation of scholars has challenged these expectations, however. First, empirical tests have been largely inconclusive and suffer from methodological and substantive limitations. Second, the logic of this classic argument excludes important political realities. This paper is part of a larger project that alters the terms of this debate in several important ways. Its first contribution is substantive. Many studies link enhanced inter-party competition to policy outcomes, such as increased welfare spending. Assertions about why such changes take place are implicit in these accounts but rarely examined. To construct a convincing account of why competition matters, it is essential to look at this missing link. Scholars often speculate that policy changes result from shifts in the amount of electoral participation, the types of individuals that are mobilized into the process, and the responses of political leaders to these changes. In this paper, we examine this last domain. We test the hypothesis implied by theories of party competition that state legislators from more competitive districts are more likely to be involved in redistributive legislative activity. The second contribution of our paper is methodological. With few exceptions, studies of inter-party competition look exclusively at cross-sectional variation. In contrast, our paper looks intensively at developments over time within three states that have differed considerably in trends in party competition since World War II: Maryland, Massachusetts, and Texas. Texas represents a logical candidate for inclusion because the state has undergone a postwar transition from a state dominated by Democrats to one where Republicans hold the levers of power. In contrast, Massachusetts was once competitive but is now dominated by a very liberal Democratic Party. Maryland provides a control case, remaining solidly Democratic throughout the period. Therefore, at the state level, we assess if changes in competitiveness over time are linked to changes in redistributive legislative activity over time. This case selection allows us to account for two important challenges to hypotheses about the effects of party competition. First, many analyses fail to consider the role of race, a curious omission given the importance of the South in these discussions and the likely role of race in creating the new competitiveness within states. Second, the proponents of party competition often fail to address the nature of one-party states. The uncompetitive Southern states of the mid-twentieth century were ruled by conservative coalitions, and several studies link policy outcomes to liberal party control rather than competition. By looking at both Northern and Southern states that vary considerably in ideology and racial composition, we can account for these possibilities. Party competition plays a peculiar role in accounts of American politics. Textbooks note its desirable properties, and comparative politics scholars have incorporated these insights into their discussions of democratization. At the same time, the empirical record is actually quite ambiguous. This paper is a step toward the construction of a more compelling account of the role of inter-party competition in our political system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]