Economics, Politics, and Timing in Second Order Elections.

In this paper, we will examine the relationship between economics and the fortunes of parties participating in their national government, and in European Parliamentary Elections from 1979 to 1999. Within national political environments, elections to the European Parliament can be labeled second order elections. As such, they offer an opportunity for citizens to express their dissatisfaction (or satisfaction) with the current government without having to risk a substantial change in their national governments. Studies of second order elections in the United States (elections to the House of Representatives and Senate when there is not a concurrent Presidential election) have demonstrated a pronounced anti-incumbent trend and provided some evidence of economic voting. In U.S. elections, the timing of second order elections relative to first order elections is fixed by the constitution. Thus, although analysts have been able to develop accurate models of the relationship between the economy and the fortunes of incumbent parties in these second order elections, they have been unable to assess the impact of the timing of these elections relative to first order elections. In Europe there is considerable variation in the timing of second order elections relative to first order elections. In this paper, we will evaluate (appropriately adapted) models of second order elections with European data, taking into account the additional variable of the timing of second order elections relative to first order elections. This will allow us to make interesting new inferences about second order elections in general as well as examine the impact that various factors have on elections to the European Parliament. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]