Notes for the Development of aCritical Democratic Theory—Political, not Legal.

Can critical theory sensibly address the problems and perils of democratic politics in the XXIst century? On what basis? Rather, based on which model of democracy? In order to assess democracy today, the tools and conceptual framework of critical theory must undergo some changes and develop conceptual clarifications that allow it to grasp (and contest) the inegalitarian dynamics of democratic politics. In this brief paper I want to take issue with the proceduralist model of deliberative democracy espoused by Habermas and point the way to a new understanding of political interaction in contemporary democracies. I will base my critical appraisal on the critique of Thomas McCarthy to Habermas’ reliance on systems theory, on Seyla Benhabib’s understanding of the normative basis of a discourse theoretic framework and Nancy Fraser’s developments concerning the character and dynamic of political interaction in contemporary (‘real existing’) democracies. In order to present my case I will 1) Identify how the systems theoretic dimension impinges on Habermas development of the concept of power, before and after the turn to communicative power based on Arendt’s notion of political action. I will map and develop the dimensions of power identified by Habermas, paying particular attention to the differences between power as steering media and power as social potential. 2. Track the implications of a limited notion of power on understanding democratic politics, based on Nancy Fraser’s (and others) development preconditions to political interaction. 3. Present the idea that egalitarian reciprocity is not a fact (nor is equality of conditions), and point to a series of issues that have to be addressed in order to develop a model capable of dealing with the challenges of inequality and domination. I want to claim that these asymmetries are not restricted to availability of resources, information or ‘natural’ abilities. They are directly created by a dynamic of exclusion and a ‘subverted’ public sphere that have to be accounted for. And the key to understanding them is a modified notion of power. 4. Explore the possibilities for a deliberative democratic model that does not hinge on the notion of a separate systems action context. I want to claim, along the lines developed by Fraser but going beyond, that the forced differentiation created by systems theory necessarily hinders the capacity to appreciate the ways in which ‘the subversion of the public sphere’ has taken, and is taking, place. I do not intend to dispense or supplant the procedural deliberative model espoused by Habermas and Benhabib. I do claim, however, that a new conceptual framework can help us better understand the perilous reality of democratic politcs and develop alternatives for action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]