Legislative Producivity and Congressional Approval.

How does public opinion respond to the production of major legislation? A central pillar of representative democracy is that elected officials are held accountable for their actions. There is a rich literature exploring the electoral effects for legislators who deviate from their district’s opinions, and there are numerous anecdotal arguments about the consequences of scandals and foibles for both legislators and executives. However, public policy is neither made by individual Members of Congress nor exclusively by executive actions. The most significant policies are enacted through laws passed by Congress and signed by the president. Scholars have very little understanding of how the public assigns credit or blame for the net output of the legislative system. This paper addresses this question directly. As part of a larger project, this paper will examine the impact of the passage of major legislation on congressional approval. Because approval ratings are collected from individuals but legislation is produced over time, the paper employs hierarchical statistical techniques to answer this question. This method has enjoyed some popularity in education and psychological research, but has not seen frequent use in political science. Concurrent research by the author indicates that while presidential approval is responsive to the production of the system, congressional approval is unaffected. Credit and blame for the joint activities of the political system are laid at the feet of the president, not Congress. This has implications for interbranch power dynamics as well as research on public opinion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]