Reigning on Spending: The Line ItemVeto.

Debates regarding the advantages and disadvantages of the line item veto continually resurface. Most analysis focuses either on the potential for the item veto to reduce “pork” spending by legislators or on possible violations of the separation of powers structured by the Constitution. This paper argues that an important consideration in this debate should be the issue of outcomes that are representative of the will of the legislature. Drawing from results that indicate that the use of bundled bills can yield outcomes that are unrepresentative of the majority of legislators’ wishes, this paper examines the potential impact of the line item veto. The results indicate that rather than producing more representative outcomes – thereby “mending” flaws in the voting mechanism – use of the item veto can yield outcomes that are even less representative. Thus, the potential costs of the line item veto outweigh the potential benefits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]