Explaining Opposition to European Integration in Britain, Denmark, and Ireland.

By focusing on recent manifestations of popular opposition to European integration in Britain, Ireland, and Denmark, this paper will explore the question of why many Europeans oppose further European integration. In Britain, the Blair government, fearing defeat, has delayed a referendum on the European Monetary Union (EMU) indefinitely, In Denmark, the EMU was defeated in a referendum in 2000. Finally, in Ireland, the Treaty of Nice was surprisingly rejected in a 2001 referendum (a result that was reversed in a second referendum in 2002). By focusing on three specific cases where opposition to European integration has been mobilized, we will be able to examine both the individual and institutional factors that have contributed to the success of efforts to mobilize public opinion against European integration. Our three cases have been chosen for this paper because of their differences rather than because of their similarities. Britain has always been a reluctant participant in Europe, and, due to Britain’s history as a great power, the British people may be particularly reluctant to cede sovereignty to institutions dominated by former rivals. Opposition to European integration in Denmark may be motivated by more concrete fears that integration will jeopardize social welfare programs and impose inordinate costs on the wealthier states of Europe, of which Denmark is one. Finally, Ireland is a country considered to be among the most supportive of efforts at European integration, and its participation in Europe has coincided with a period of economic growth. Nevertheless, it is clear that even in Ireland, opposition to Europe can be mobilized if the circumstances are right. Previous research suggests several possible explanations. First, opposition to European integration reflects the continuing strength of national identities and the corresponding weakness of attachments to a larger Europe. Second, many Europeans fear that any benefits accruing from greater economic integration will be outweighed by economic costs, such as higher taxes, the loss of government subsidies, or the loss of employment. Third, opposition to European integration results from dissatisfaction with political elites, either at the national or European level. Finally, the importance of political parties in mobilizing opposition to European integration has been widely noted. We propose to test these hypotheses on two levels. First, using Eurobarometer surveys, we will consider these hypotheses at the individual level. Which social groups oppose European integration and what other values and opinions tend to coincide with such opposition? Second, we will consider the institutional actors, such as political parties, that have worked to mobilize opposition to European integration within these countries. What are the social bases of these parties or interest groups, and what are the primary arguments that they use against Europe? Our working hypothesis is that both the fear of economic costs and anti-elite sentiments can be used to mobilize opposition to Europe by parties and groups; however, such opposition can be mobilized only when national identities are strong and broader European identities are weak. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]