Venture investment under multi-stage incentive model based on fairness concerns.

Purpose: This study explores the impact of EN's (venture entrepreneurs, simplified as EN) jealousy fairness concerns coefficient on two-stage venture capital decision-making in cases of symmetrical and asymmetrical information. It discusses the equilibrium solution of two-stage venture. Design/methodology/approach: The principal-agent model was established based on multiple periods, and differentiated contracts were established at different stages. The validity of the models and the contract was verified by numerical simulation. Findings: The results suggest that with the increase in the EN fairness concerns coefficient, the effort level of EN decreases continuously and decreases faster in the second stage because this is the last stage. The level of VC's (venture capitalist, simplified as VC) effort declines first and then increases; that is, VC will increase the effort level when the fairness concerns coefficient increases to a certain threshold. To motivate EN to pay more effort, VC will increase the incentive to EN in the first stage. However, it will reduce the level of incentive to EN in the second stage. In the limited stage of venture investment, consider that the fairness concerns of EN do not make the profits of EN and VC achieve Pareto improvement simultaneously. Originality/value: First, the authors implanted fairness concerns into multi-stage venture capital and discussed the impact of fairness concerns on the efforts and returns of both parties. Second, among the influencing factors of the project output, the authors consider the bilateral efforts of EN and VC, the working capacity of EN, the initial investment scale, and the external uncertain environment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]