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Minimalism and Truth-Value Gaps.
- Source :
-
Philosophical Studies . Jan2000, Vol. 97 Issue 2, p137-168. 32p. - Publication Year :
- 2000
-
Abstract
- The article analyzes minimalism and truth-value gaps. Minimalism about truth has two parts, one negative and one positive. It is tempting to start with an attempt to characterize the negative. The author's aim here is to find a middle path, a compromise that sees the best in both positions. On one side there are the compatibilists who hold that one can quite consistently embrace a minimalist theory of truth, whilst isolating a set of meaningful declarative sentences which do not have truth-values. Opposed to them are the incompatibilists. The incompatibilists hold that once one accepts a minimalist account of truth, one is forced to say that all the meaningful declarative sentences possess truth-values.
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 00318116
- Volume :
- 97
- Issue :
- 2
- Database :
- Academic Search Index
- Journal :
- Philosophical Studies
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 16356122
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1018311821799