基于演化博弈的水权交易双方行为策略选择及 案例仿真.

Water resource shortages have become a national issue in China. Population growth and climate change tend to further aggravate this problem. Water rights trading is an economic means for alleviating the shortages and inefficient utilization of water resources and effectively promoting their optimal allocation. As the strategy choice of both parties of the trading directly affects the efficiency of water rights trading, this paper systematically analyzes the relevant parameters affecting the bilateral strategy choice of water rights trading based on the evolutionary game theory. First, given the impact of the market competition environment on the efficiency of water rights trading, this paper assumes that market competition is the major risk factor leading to the breakdown of negotiations; establishes the income matrix of both sides of water rights trading based on the bargaining model with the risk of breakdown; and analyzes the position, stability, and system evolution mechanism of the equilibrium point under different circumstances. Second, to emphasize the important influence of the initial strategy point on the equilibrium result of the evolutionary game, this paper describes the relative competition conditions according to the number of potential partners on both sides and further determines the initial strategy point of the game system. On this basis, the stability of the bilateral strategy choice is analyzed by using evolutionary game theory. Finally, the case of water rights trading between Zhongning City and Jingneng Power Plant is simulated and analyzed with the help of MATLAB. The results show that the trading water volume, the water resource utilization level of the transferee, and market competition have a significant impact on the transaction price, and: ① The efficiency of water rights trading will be affected when the demand of the transferee for water rights is too low and the water rights saved by the transferor cannot be effectively split. On the contrary, the sharp increase in the comprehensive compensation cost will directly raise the expected price of the transferor and will also affect the efficiency of the water rights trading. ② When the transaction price and other conditions are given, the water use efficiency of the transferee is directly proportional to the convergence speed of the water rights trading game system. ③ When the water use efficiency of the transferee of water rights is high, the price of water rights trading can be appropriately increased to realize the paid use of water resources and ensure the property income of the transferor of water rights. ④ When the transaction price and other conditions are given, the more participants in the water rights trading market, the more conducive it is to the conclusion of water rights trading. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]