Back to Search
Start Over
Why Pains Are Not Mental Objects.
- Source :
-
Philosophical Studies . Aug1998, Vol. 91 Issue 2, p127-148. 22p. - Publication Year :
- 1998
-
Abstract
- This article presents pain as mental object. It explicitly defends the thesis that pain is a mental object, and it is a major goal of this paper to dispute this view, and argue that pain is more accurately described adverbially as the way that one perceive or sense something, rather than something we perceive or sense. Furthermore the author believe that the mental object view of pain is the source of other problems and disputes in this area. Perhaps to clearly establish the difference between the connate and the alien accusative it would help to consider some other similar cases.
- Subjects :
- *PAIN
*PHILOSOPHY
*SENSORY perception
*COGNITION
*THEORY of knowledge
*PSYCHOLOGY
Subjects
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 00318116
- Volume :
- 91
- Issue :
- 2
- Database :
- Academic Search Index
- Journal :
- Philosophical Studies
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 16630377
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004280711849