Analysis on the Tripartite Game of New Energy Vehicle Manufacturers Considering the Impact of Dual Credit Policy in the Context of Dual Carbon.

Accelerating the popularization and application of new energy vehicles (NEVs) is one of the important measures for the transportation industry to achieve energy conservation and emission reduction targets. The "dual carbon goal" (carbon peaking and carbon neutrality) further clarifies the NEVs as the direction of the automobile industry and presents more requests for the transportation. Aiming at the problems of uneven development of the new energy vehicle market and imbalance of supply and demand in the integrated market, a tripartite evolutionary game model was constructed based on the evolutionary game theory. In this model, the MATLAB simulation experiments is applied to explore the interaction mechanism among the government, automobile manufacturing enterprises and consumers under the dual credit policy, and the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) of the model was obtained in this study. The results demonstrate that under the dual credit policy (corporate average fuel consumption and new energy vehicle credits), the results of the behaviour evolution game of the government, automobile manufacturers and consumers tend to choose the strategy of "strict regulation, production of NEVs, purchase of NEVs". At the same time, the cost of strict government regulation, the profit from reducing carbon emissions, the fact that small companies have to pay the government for producing fuel vehicles, and the profit consumers derive from taking a positive attitude are important factors affecting tripartite decision-making. The conclusions obtained in this study offer significantly references for targets for saving energy and reducing emissions and carbon neutrality in the transportation industry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]