آیا جوهر ذهنی میتواند برخی ویژگیهاي فیزیکی را داشته باشد؟ ارزیابی مدعاي جاناتان لو.

The main problem of Cartesian Dualism which turns it to an outdated view is mental causation; If mental and physical substance have no mutual property, how we could explain the causal relation between them. Jonathan Lowe reconsiders Cartesian view and introduces his Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism which maintains that I, as a subject of my own experiences, literally can have some physical properties of my body. However, I think his afford is not consequent; By introducing a distinction between negative and positive possibility, first I argue that he needs positive possibility for his view. But as he committed to this idea that the identity of a property depends, at least in part, on its substance, he cannot use the idea of having a property derivatively to show this possibility. However, by resorting to the idea of spatiality of mind, I think we can maintain his core idea and believe that mind literally could has some physical properties. At the end, I will also try to answer to Kim's critiques about the idea of spatiality of mind. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]