Judicial activism and ratification of environmental treaties.

A key theory of environmental politics holds that states must achieve a certain level of economic development before environmental protection will occur. The assumption is that once people attain economic satisfaction, they are no longer willing to accept environmental degradation in return for a greater standard of living. Yet, numerous developing states ratify environmental treaties without achieving a median-level per-capita income. How do some states reach environmental goals that require some behaviour change without the assumed demands of the citizenry? This paper argues that judicial autonomy may be the key to bringing environmental protection to the poorest states in the developing world. Activist judges, free of political interference, can push through policies that are unpopular but serve the greater good. Reacting to this, governments may be more likely to sign and ratify international environmental agreements. Using patterns of ratification for two conventions, I find evidence in favour of the hypothesis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]