Competition or Competitors? The Case of Self-Preferencing.

This article explores the concept of "self-preferencing" by dominant firms in the context of competition law. It challenges the assumption that self-preferencing is always anticompetitive and argues that it is a natural part of competition. The article examines legal cases in the US and Europe that have dealt with self-preferencing, highlighting the different approaches taken by regulators. It concludes that distinguishing between anticompetitive and benign self-preferencing is crucial, and that condemning all self-preferencing can harm competition and the economy. The article also discusses self-preferencing among digital platforms and its implications for antitrust regulation, arguing that it should be considered legal to avoid hindering innovation and investment in the tech sector. It compares the approaches of the US and European Union in addressing self-preferencing, emphasizing the differences in their legal frameworks. The article recommends that self-preferencing should be presumed legal and that existing case law should be followed. [Extracted from the article]