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Supply chain coordination based on revenue-sharing contract with a loss-averse retailer and capital constraint.
- Source :
-
Soft Computing - A Fusion of Foundations, Methodologies & Applications . Feb2024, Vol. 28 Issue 4, p3015-3028. 14p. - Publication Year :
- 2024
-
Abstract
- The paper aims to provide a theoretical basis for the application of revenue-sharing contract under bounded rationality and capital constraints. We consider an uncooperative ordering model in a supplier-Stackelberg game and coordination strategy with revenue-sharing contract for a loss-averse and capital-constrained retailer. We drive the existence and uniqueness conditions of the optimal solutions under bank financing and revenue-sharing contract. We also develop a series of propositions and corollaries to determine the optimal solutions and offer some managerial insights. The key contribution of the paper is to deepen and expand the revenue-sharing contract under the risk-neutral assumption, and to provide a theoretical basis for the application of revenue-sharing contract under bounded rationality and capital constraints. We find that the revenue-sharing ratio of loss-averse and capital-constrained retailer is larger than that of neutral retailer and the expected utility of loss-averse and capital-constrained retailer is larger than that of neutral retailer under coordination strategy with revenue-sharing contract. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Subjects :
- *SUPPLY chains
*BOUNDED rationality
*EXPECTED utility
*CONTRACTS
*RETAIL industry
Subjects
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 14327643
- Volume :
- 28
- Issue :
- 4
- Database :
- Academic Search Index
- Journal :
- Soft Computing - A Fusion of Foundations, Methodologies & Applications
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 175234524
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1007/s00500-023-09229-y