Explicit Upper Bound Of Impossible Differentials For AES-Like Ciphers: Application To uBlock And Midori.

Whether a block cipher can resist impossible differential attack is an important basis to evaluate the security of a block cipher. However, the length of impossible differentials is important for the security evaluation of block ciphers. Most of the previous studies are based on structural cryptanalysis to find the impossible differential, and the structural cryptanalysis covers a lot of specific cryptanalytic vectors which are independent of the nonlinear S-boxes. In this paper, we study the maximum length of the impossible differential of an Advanced Encryption Standard-like cipher in the setting with the details of S-boxes. Inspired by the 'Divide-and-Conquer' technique, we propose a new technique called Reduced Block , which combines the details of the S-box. With this tool, the maximum length of impossible differentials can be proven under reasonable assumptions. As applications, we use this tool on uBlock and Midori. Consequently, we prove that for uBlock-128, uBlock-256 and Midori-64, there are no impossible five-round, six-round and seven-round differentials with one active input nibble and one active output nibble, even when considering the details of S-boxes. Furthermore, we reveal some properties of the uBlock S-box and linear layer and demonstrate theoretically that there are no impossible differentials longer than four rounds for uBlock-128 under the assumption that the round keys are independent and uniformly random. This study might provide some insight into the bounds of the length of impossible differentials. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]