Pricing competition in maritime transportation with blockchain technology and empty container repositioning.

A duopoly maritime transportation system with two ocean carriers providing cargo transport services between two sea ports is investigated in this paper. Pricing game models are developed to describe the competitive relationship between the two ocean carriers with/without blockchain adoption. Empty container repositioning is characterized in the models. Through model analysis, the pricing equilibria are derived. Using theoretical analysis and numerical studies, we find that (1) only when the fixed cost of blockchain is low do carriers adopt blockchain technology; (2) regardless of whether or not the competitor adopts blockchain technology, the carrier is better off by adopting it; (3) when both participants choose to adopt blockchain technology, the impact of blockchain on actual demand is not always positive unless the original operational costs are relatively high; and (4) sometimes, empty containers caused by demand imbalance in the two transportation directions are helpful in increasing the carrier's profit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]