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How to commit to commissive self‐knowledge.
- Source :
-
European Journal of Philosophy . Mar2024, Vol. 32 Issue 1, p210-223. 14p. - Publication Year :
- 2024
-
Abstract
- At least some of your beliefs are commitments. When you believe that P as a commitment, your stance on P is such that you believe it on the basis of your considered judgement. Sometimes, you also believe that you believe P. Such self‐beliefs can also be commissive in a sense, as when they are reflective endorsements of your lower‐order commissive beliefs. In this paper I argue that one's commissive self‐beliefs ontologically constitute one's lower‐order commissive beliefs because one's commissive self‐beliefs instantiate the same inferential dispositions that are constitutive of one's lower‐order commissive beliefs. Constitutive relations between commissive self‐beliefs and first‐order commissive beliefs are maximally epistemically secure because they do not result from any epistemic procedure by which one must try (and possibly fail) to detect one's first‐order commissive beliefs. This maximal epistemic security suffices to warrant one's commissive self‐beliefs, such that one possesses commissive self‐knowledge of an especially privileged sort. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Subjects :
- *PHENOMENOLOGY
*MIND & body
*ONTOLOGY
*BELIEF & doubt
*CONSCIOUSNESS
Subjects
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 09668373
- Volume :
- 32
- Issue :
- 1
- Database :
- Academic Search Index
- Journal :
- European Journal of Philosophy
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 176213923
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12862