Research on multilateral collaboration strategies in agricultural seed quality assurance.

Seeds, as the initial products in agricultural systems, play a pivotal role in ensuring quality, fundamental to national food security and sustainable agricultural development. This study introduces a concept integrating public governance and evolutionary game theory to construct a quadripartite evolutionary game model involving seed companies, certification agencies, farmers, and governmental departments. It considers the strategic choices of these stakeholders under varying economic motivations and market mechanisms, as well as the influence of external regulation and incentives on game strategies. The existence conditions for evolutionarily stable strategy combinations are determined using the Lyapunov first method, and MATLAB is employed for numerical simulation analysis to validate the game analysis under initial conditions. The simulation results reveal two potential equilibrium points corresponding to different strategic choices among stakeholders. The study finds that producing high-quality seeds and the refusal of certification agencies to engage in rent-seeking are crucial for ensuring seed quality. Additionally, the cost–benefit ratio of seed companies, the speculative cost of certification agencies, and the rights-protection cost of farmers are key determinants in the evolution of seed quality assurance strategies. This research also holds practical significance in enhancing seed quality assurance mechanisms and fostering sustainable development in agriculture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]