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Legislative Cooperation and Selective Benefits: An experimental investigation on the limits of credit claiming.
- Source :
-
Statistics & Public Policy . May2024, p1-13. 13p. 5 Illustrations, 6 Charts. - Publication Year :
- 2024
-
Abstract
- AbstractDo legislators get credit for working with the other party? Studies on this have been limited due to a lack of an appropriate counterfactual. This paper experimentally estimates the value of credit claiming on a small project that was produced with bipartisanship or with an uncooperative party. I argue that process does indeed matter. Specifically, I hypothesize voters will punish in-party partisans for working with the other side and punish out-party partisans when they do not work with their side. However, in-party partisans do not care whether their party works with the other side. Out-party partisans punish members for uncooperative legislating. Further, I argue and find that these effects are distinguishable from overall partisan effects, demonstrating that members can use distributional projects to gain out-party support in a polarized environment. These findings have important implications for lawmaking and polarization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 2330443X
- Database :
- Academic Search Index
- Journal :
- Statistics & Public Policy
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 177388782
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1080/2330443x.2024.2358887