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A Note on the Epistemological Value of Pretense Imagination.
- Source :
-
Episteme (Cambridge University Press) . Mar2024, Vol. 21 Issue 1, p99-118. 20p. - Publication Year :
- 2024
-
Abstract
- Pretense imagination is imagination understood as the ability to recreate rational belief revision. This kind of imagination is used in pretend-play, risk-assessment, etc. Some even claim that this kind of hypothetical belief revision can be grounds to justify new beliefs in conditionals, in particular conditionals that play a foundational role in the epistemology of modality. In this paper, I will argue that it cannot. I will first provide a very general theory of pretense imagination, which I formalise using tools from dynamic epistemic logic. As a result, we can clearly see that pretense imagination episodes are build up out of two kinds of imaginative stages, so I will present an argument by cases. This argument shows that pretense imagination might indeed provide us with justification for believing certain conditionals. Despite this, I will argue that these are not the kind of conditionals that allow pretense imagination to play a foundational role in the epistemology of modality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Subjects :
- *IMAGINATION
*EPISTEMIC logic
*THEORY of knowledge
Subjects
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 17423600
- Volume :
- 21
- Issue :
- 1
- Database :
- Academic Search Index
- Journal :
- Episteme (Cambridge University Press)
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 177461046
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2021.2