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The Unity of Perceptual Content.
- Source :
-
Philosophical Quarterly . Jul2024, Vol. 74 Issue 3, p941-961. 21p. - Publication Year :
- 2024
-
Abstract
- Representationalists hold that perceptual experience is a conscious representational state with content, something which is accurate or inaccurate in certain conditions. The most common version of Representationalism takes perceptual content to be singular in the object-place and otherwise consisting of attribution of properties (Singularism/Attributionism). Schellenberg has recently developed a version on which perceptual content is singular even in the property-place in containing a de re mode of presentation of a property-instance (Particularism). In this paper, I show that Particularism faces a version of the problem of the Unity of Perceptual Content. Namely, its supporters haven't told us how objects can be bound together with property-instances into a content such that it represents them and has accuracy-conditions. Furthermore, I argue that Particularists face an in-principle obstacle in solving it. In contrast, Attributionists can solve the problem and that establishes their view as the only game in town. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Subjects :
- *REPRESENTATION (Philosophy)
*REALISM
*PHENOMENOLOGY
*PHILOSOPHERS
Subjects
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 00318094
- Volume :
- 74
- Issue :
- 3
- Database :
- Academic Search Index
- Journal :
- Philosophical Quarterly
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 177680996
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad105