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Pure strategy Nash equilibria for bargaining models of collective choice.
- Source :
-
International Journal of Game Theory . Jun2024, Vol. 53 Issue 2, p373-421. 49p. - Publication Year :
- 2024
-
Abstract
- This paper considers pure strategy Nash equilibria of non-cooperative legislative bargaining models. In contrast to existing legislative bargaining models, we derive legislators behavior from stochastic utility maximization. This approach allows us to prove the existence of a stationary Pure Local and Global Nash Equilibrium under rather general settings. The mathematical proof is based on a fixed point argument, which can also be used as a numerical method to determine an equilibrium. We characterize the equilibrium outcome as a lottery of legislators' proposals and prove a Mean Voter Theorem, i.e., proposals result dimension-by-dimension as a weighted mean of legislators' ideal points and are Pareto-optimal. Based on a simple example, we illustrate different logic of our model compared to mixed strategy equilibrium of the legislative bargaining model suggested by Banks and Duggan (Am Polit Sci Rev 94(1):73–88. https://doi.org/10.2307/2586381, 2000). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Subjects :
- *SOCIAL choice
*NASH equilibrium
*NEGOTIATION
*MATHEMATICAL proofs
*GAME theory
Subjects
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 00207276
- Volume :
- 53
- Issue :
- 2
- Database :
- Academic Search Index
- Journal :
- International Journal of Game Theory
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 178027608
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-023-00882-z