Nietzsche's naturalistic account of value and normativity.

This paper argues that Nietzsche shares the aim of contemporary Sellarsian efforts to reconcile the natural and the normative. However, as Joseph Rouse notes, the Sellarsian strategy collapses into dualism by virtue of its treatment of natural causality and normativity as different in kind and of the normative as operating parallel to the causal (Rouse 2002). The paper argues that Nietzsche avoids this dualism by offering a constitutively causal account of the normative. He does this by identifying the normative with dominant drives of the self. It is argued that these dominant drives, like natural causes in the world, are modally dispositional and differ from natural causes in degree rather than dualistically in kind. However, the identification of the normative status of our values with dominant drives has been subject to strenuous criticism. Specifically, it is argued that the normative cannot be identified with dominant drives for fear of eliminating the normative. The paper responds to these criticisms in detail and argues that the constitutively causal account of normativity that stems from Nietzsche's identification of the normative with dominant drives can be defended. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]