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Pretending and disbelieving.
- Source :
-
Inquiry . Jul2024, Vol. 67 Issue 6, p1991-2004. 14p. - Publication Year :
- 2024
-
Abstract
- I formulate and criticise a condition that captures some recent ideas on the nature of pretence, namely, the disbelief condition. According to an initial understanding of this condition, an agent who is pretending that P must also disbelieve that P. I criticise this idea by proposing a counterexample showing that an agent may be in a state of pretence that does not imply disbelief in what is pretended. I also draw some general conclusions about the nature of pretence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Subjects :
- *IMAGINATION
Subjects
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 0020174X
- Volume :
- 67
- Issue :
- 6
- Database :
- Academic Search Index
- Journal :
- Inquiry
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 178068436
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2021.1982403