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Judgments vs Propositions in Alexander of Aphrodisias' Conception of Logic.
- Source :
-
History & Philosophy of Logic . Aug2024, p1-15. 15p. - Publication Year :
- 2024
-
Abstract
- This paper stresses the importance of identifying the nature of an author's conception of logic when using terms from modern logic in order to avoid, as far as possible, injecting our own conception of logic in the author's texts. Sundholm (2012. “‘Inference versus consequence” revisited: Inference, conditional, implication’, Synthese, 187, 943–956) points out that <italic>inferences</italic> are staged at the epistemic level and are made out of judgments, not propositions. Since it is now standard to read Aristotelian <italic>sullogismoi</italic> as inferences, I have taken Alexander of Aphrodisias's commentaries to Aristotle's logical treatises as a basis for arguing that the premises and conclusions should be read as judgments rather than as propositions. Under this reading, when Alexander speaks of <italic>protaseis</italic>, we should not read the modern notion of proposition, but rather what we now call judgments. The point is not just a matter of terminology, it is about the conception of logic this terminology conveys. In this regard, insisting on judgments rather than on propositions helps bring to light Alexander's epistemic conception of logic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Subjects :
- *JUDGMENT (Logic)
*LOGIC
*TERMS & phrases
*EPISTEMIC logic
Subjects
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 01445340
- Database :
- Academic Search Index
- Journal :
- History & Philosophy of Logic
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 178990830
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2024.2381987