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The relationship of the source of punishment and personality traits with investment and punishment in a public goods game.

Authors :
Rodrigues, Johannes
Leipold, Natasha
Hewig, Johannes
Hein, Grit
Source :
Scientific Reports. 9/9/2024, Vol. 14 Issue 1, p1-14. 14p.
Publication Year :
2024

Abstract

In this study, we investigated the motivations behind punishing individuals who exploit common resources, a phenomenon crucial for resource preservation. While some researchers suggest punishment stems from concern for the common good, others propose it is driven by anger toward free riders. To probe these motivations, we developed a modified public goods game in which participants had the option to use their own money or the money from the common pool to punish free riders. The analysis included choice behavior, mouse trajectories, and personality traits like anger, empathy, and altruism. According to our results, investments were highest, and punishment was strongest if participants could punish using credits from the common pool, indicating that this is the preferred option to diminish free riding and maintain cooperation in public goods and common good contexts. Also, punishment was highest if the punisher's own investment was high, and the investment of others was low. Concerning traits, highly altruistic individuals tended to invest more and punish less in general but gave harsher punishments when they did choose to use the common pool punitively. Conversely, trait anger and trait empathy were linked to low investment while trait empathy also tended to be related to lower punishment. Taken together, these findings underscore the role of situational factors and personality traits in fostering cooperative behavior and shaping societal norms around costly punishment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Details

Language :
English
ISSN :
20452322
Volume :
14
Issue :
1
Database :
Academic Search Index
Journal :
Scientific Reports
Publication Type :
Academic Journal
Accession number :
179534612
Full Text :
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-024-71106-x