Corruption and Compliance: Explaining Variations in Compliance with the 1997 OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.

What explains variations in state compliance with the 1997 OECD "Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions."? In an initial phase of follow-up monitoring to evaluate each country's implementing legislation, this Convention's peer-review monitoring group found a surprising variation in the compliance records of the OECD's four largest members. While Germany and the United States 'satisfactorily' complied with the Convention, France only 'sufficiently' complied and the United Kingdom did not comply. Why did some states comply and others not? Given the Convention's optimal design, function, and normative basis from the point of view of compliance theory, this outcome is particularly surprising. Employing evidence from research in the fours countries, and focusing on the U.K. case in particular, the paper assesses three alternative explanations for the observed variations in compliance: unintentional non-compliance; strategic trade; and norms related to transnational bribery. The analysis finds that none of the explanations initially suggested by the evidence is complete, but that a combination of strategic trade interests and normative factors is at play. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of this study for compliance theory in IR, and theories of international politics in general. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]