The Costs of Escalation: Parliamentary Governments and Foreign Policy Choices 1945-1992.

: Do the costs associated with government removal effect decisions to escalate disputes. I develop a framework of government decisions making in parliamentary systems focusing on the costs that parties face when considering government change. I argue that leaders act primarily to maintain office but are constrained or encouraged by the opportunity and transaction costs that emerge from the larger political system. I tie this into the audience costs literature and focus on how variation in different parliamentary systems? removal costs effect both government policy choice as well as its signaling capability. I not only focus in escalation but also disputes that settle short of escalation. If governments are able to use audience costs to signal credibility and resolve some disputes should actually never escalate and instead settle quickly. The work in this field has tended to focus on democracy as a present or absent condition. I argue that it is just as important to understand how cohesive and divisive oppositions and partisan politics can effect policy choices. I empirically assess my theoretical expectations with data of 18 parliamentary governments and oppositions between the years of 1945 and 1992 using the SHERFACS dataset. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]