THE UK’S FLIRTATION WITH ELECTED MAYORS: Could the Giuliani factor help this policy transplant to develop roots?

The ‘New Labour’ Party came into office in 1997 committed to ‘modernise’, among other institutions, UK local government. A ‘flagship’ policy in its modernisation agenda was to replace the traditional committee system with, for the first time in the UK, executive-based local government, headed preferably by directly elected executive mayors. The first section of this paper outlines the origins of this mayoral policy, its legislative embodiment in the Local Government Act 2000, and its implementation. It outlines the three executive models that constituted the restricted choice available to most local authorities and the consultations that councils were required to undertake, including the statutory referendums required prior to the introduction of a directly elected mayor. It concludes with the recent election of the first eight of these English mayors and the political embarrassment that several of the elections produced for the Government. The second main section of the paper reviews these events with reference to the main programme theme of APSA 2002: the contribution (or lack of it) of political science research to policy development. Its conclusion is that two obvious opportunities for lesson-drawing - learning from experience in other countries, including the US, and learning through experimentation and the piloting of different executive models in selected UK authorities - were largely ignored, and that this resistance to lesson-drawing has been at least one of the major reasons for the low and generally negative impact of the Government’s mayoral policy to date. As for the rhetorical question in the sub-title, there was a moment when it looked possible that the chance injection of a ‘Giuliani factor’ following the events of 9/11 might stimulate public interest and acceptance of the idea of elected mayors … but it didn’t! [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]