Coordinating principal–agent and incentive strategy of cold chain logistics service in fresh food supply chain.

With the increasing production and circulation of fresh food, society's requirements for product quality have also increased. Currently, upstream and downstream enterprises in the fresh food supply chain tend to delegate the cold chain transportation of fresh food to third–party cold chain logistics (CCL) service providers who offer more professional integrated preservation services. This study adopts coordination theory to research the delegation, coordination, and incentive strategies between a Fresh Food Producer, Distributor, and CCL Service Provider. The aim is to promote the efforts of the CCL Service Provider in improving freshness and achieving the overall optimal interests of the fresh food supply chain. First, the basic models of the Fresh Food Producer and Distributor individually entrusting the CCL Service Provider are established under different information conditions. Second, a collaborative delegation agency model between the Fresh Food Producer and Distributor is established on top of the basic models. Finally, through the optimal decision solutions under different information conditions and numerical calculations of preservation benefit levels, the following conclusions are drawn: (1) The more transparent and open the information environment, the more it can encourage the CCL Service Provider to improve the quality of their preservation services, allowing the Fresh Food Producer and Distributor to obtain more significant preservation benefits. However, when information is completely transparent, the incentive mechanisms formulated by the Fresh Food Producer and Distributor become ineffective. (2) Collaborative cooperation strategies can encourage the CCL Service Provider to enhance their preservation efforts while strengthening the effectiveness of relevant incentive strategies for the Fresh Food Producer and Distributor. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]