FIKIH, DÎNİN VE ŞERÎATİN NESİ OLUR?: DİN, ŞERÎAT, İSLAM VE FIKIH KAVRAMLARI ÜZERİNE BİR DEĞERLENDİRME.

Nowadays, in contemporary discourses, it can be said that religious discourses are quite complex and confusing. Especially the concepts of religion, Sharia, and jurisprudence have become obfuscated being used interchangeably. This phenomenon is evident in certain studies where jurisprudence, inherently a scholarly activity of jurists, is perceived as if it was a religion or Sharia directly ordained by the Lawgiver. This conflation fosters various misunderstandings and misjudgments. Essentially, jurisprudence which is a dynamic process aimed at regulating social relationships on the basis of justice and equity is rendered dogmatic by these misinterpretations. Consequently, this misunderstanding naturally reflects on the usage of the term ‘Islam’, causing ambiguity regarding the essence of Islam or what constitutes Islamic principles. Consequently, the solutions produced by Muslim societies in the past within the framework of religious and sources of Sharia are perceived as religion or Sharia itself and equated with religion and Sharia ordained by the Lawgiver. Perceiving the marriage age of Aisha as a requirement or result of religion is a typical example of this misunderstanding. In such case, devout individuals may advocate for early marriage today, believing it to be a religious mandate, while opponents of religion criticize religion based on this acceptance. It is clear that both attitudes are wrong and that this error stems from treating existing data and the opinions of jurists as religious doctrines. While religious injunctions may indeed serve as the core reference in issuing judgments, and jurists might legitimize their everyday life-related rulings through these injunctions, the other pivot of this compass is the customary, the accepted, and functional outcomes of the period. The judgments related to slavery and concubinage are also of this nature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]