Can outrage be truly moral?

We critically examine the concept of moral outrage within the context of contemporary psychological and moral theory. The prevailing assumption that moral outrage should be a form of disinterested anger—where the individual is uninvolved—presents significant challenges for understanding its moral character. We propose a socioconstructionist approach to moral emotions, arguing that outrage is not inherently disinterested but rather deeply embedded in social norms. By examining moral anger and outrage through this lens, we show that outrage, though often seen as subjective or selfish, can still serve prosocial functions and uphold moral standards. We discuss how norms shape the expression of moral emotions, suggesting that outrage not only responds to norm violations but also plays a role in shaping these norms. We conclude by proposing a more nuanced understanding of moral outrage that integrates personal involvement and normativity to reconcile its subjective nature with its social and moral significance. This approach provides a framework for more robust empirical studies and a deeper understanding of the relationship between emotions, morality, and social norms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]