Presidents and the Politicization of the United States Federal Government, 1988-2004.

In this paper I explain when politicization occurs in the U.S. federal government, focusing on the tradeoff between political control and bureaucratic competence. I analyze data on the percentage of political appointments among managers in 250 federal agencies over the 1988-2004 period. I show that politicization is neither increasing steadily over time nor caused by the actions of Republican presidents. Politicization increases when agency preferences diverge from those of the president and when agency outputs are relatively insensitive to changes in politicization such as when agency tasks are uncomplicated or when outside wages available to career managers are low. Politicization also increases during periods when Congress and the president share similar policy preferences. I conclude that politicization occurs in regular and predictable patterns and that understanding these patterns are essential for an understanding of American politics, public management, and the policy process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]