The U.S. Way of War and the “War on Terror”.

Focusing on the two most significant deployments of U.S. military force in the ‘global war on terror,’ this article examines U.S. military strategy after September 11, 2001. The main thesis is that the post-9/11 U.S. military strategy is a product of a revised ‘way of war’ that was developed by U.S. armed forces after Vietnam and the first Gulf War, rather than by significant aspects of the post-9/11 environment. The article highlights the influence of the U.S. Army on American strategic culture and the subsequent reliance of the army on technology and conventional warfare—a strategy that eschews the broader social and political implications of warfare. Military outcomes in both Iraq and Afghanistan are seen as reflective of the shortcomings inherent within the model of military strategy that the U.S. Army, in particular, has developed over the last 30 years. The article explains the particular emphases in U.S. grand strategy and recurrent weaknesses in the U.S. response to 9/11. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]