Was the Iraq War a Humanitarian Intervention?

This article assesses whether the 2003 invasion of Iraq can be justified as a humanitarian intervention. Because of the potential loss of life inherent in any military action, the author contends that a threshold test of a humanitarian intervention is whether it is necessary to stop ongoing or imminent mass slaughter. Although that test might have been met, say, at the time of the 1988 genocide against the Kurds, there was no ongoing or imminent mass slaughter in Iraq in March 2003. That lack is decisive in undermining claims that the invasion of Iraq was a humanitarian intervention. Apart from this threshold test, the author also considers several secondary factors: whether force was the last resort, whether the invasion was guided primarily by a humanitarian purpose, whether it was conducted with maximum respect for international human rights and humanitarian law, whether it was likely to produce more good than harm, and whether, ideally though not necessarily, it was endorsed by the UN Security Council. The author concludes that the invasion of Iraq fails most of these secondary tests as well: the war as conceived in early 2003 was not primarily about stopping atrocities; non-military options for achieving its other stated purposes had not been exhausted; although the invading forces generally respected international humanitarian law, there were certain major exceptions; and the UN Security Council was never asked to contemplate a humanitarian intervention in Iraq. At most, it was reasonable to conclude in March 2003 that overthrowing Saddam Hussein might do more good than harm. On balance, therefore, the author concludes that the Iraq war cannot be justified as a humanitarian intervention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]