Between Iraq and a Hard Place: UN Arms Inspections and the Politics of Security Council Resolution 1441.

After the unanimous passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1441 in November 2002, the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspections Commission (UNMOVIC) found itself operating under incompatible mandates. Resolution 1284, which established UNMOVIC in December 1999 to replace UNSCOM, envisioned a less confrontational approach to arms inspections. Resolution 1441, however, presented Iraq with an ultimatum and a short timeline for full compliance to avoid serious consequences. This paper develops a theoretical account of how UNMOVIC, and its Executive Chairman Hans Blix, managed the conflicting external pressures on the organization in the run-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. I draw on principal-agent theories of delegation to international institutions, and on theories of organizational culture from organizational sociology, to explain UNMOVICs response to its dilemma. The incompatibility of resolutions 1284 and 1441, and the dissension on the Security Council regarding 1441's interpretation, constituted a very complex set of principal-agent relationships between member states, the Security Council, and UNMOVIC. The paper argues that UNMOVICs management of this situation reflected its organizational culture. The paper also considers implications of the argument for the integration of rationalist and sociological institutionalist perspectives on international organizations, and for the future of UN arms inspections. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]