Multilateralism: America's Insurance Policy Against Loss.

When the U.S. engages in large-scale military operations and faces loss or defeat, it is often loathed to negotiate or make concessions, due to fears about reputational costs, as well as a number of cultural and psychological factors including overconfidence, moralism, and the "lessons" of the 1930s. A multilateral setting for the use of force can help to correct the U.S. bias against compromise through a number of pathways. First, allies can directly pressure Washington to moderate its policy. Second, dovish elements in the U.S. administration can utilize the multilateral setting to outmaneuver hardliners. Third, allies and organizations can provide political cover for U.S. compromise by sharing responsibility for concessions. Multilateral uses of force produce inefficiencies and constraints, but these costs represent a premium that is paid when operations are successful, so that the U.S. has an insurance policy that minimizes loss in times of failure. When the U.S. fought in Korea, Truman had - unknowingly - taken out an insurance policy by fighting multilaterally. The presence of allies and organizations promoted a policy of American restraint that ultimately served U.S. interests. In contrast, the essentially unilateral nature of the war in Vietnam was a major reason why the U.S. was unable to negotiate or withdraw, and instead engaged in disastrous escalation. In Iraq today, President Bush's decision to fight with a "coalition of the willing" dominated by the U.S., rather than with a broad alliance under U.N. authorization, means that Washington is fighting a war without insurance. As a result, if the U.S. should fail, it will find it more difficult to withdraw. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]