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Responsibility Attributions, Accountability and Economic Voting: The effect of European Multi-level Governance in Britain.

Authors :
Anderson, Cameron D.
Source :
Conference Papers -- American Political Science Association. 2006 Annual Meeting, p1-19. 19p. 3 Charts.
Publication Year :
2006

Abstract

Captured by the term "multilevel governance", an important international trend over the past 30 years has been the shifting exercise of political authority away from the traditional nation-state; both upwards to international institutions such as the European Union as well as downwards to increasingly empowered sub-national governments. While the changing loci of authority is widely lauded as valuable for effective responses to emerging policy challenges, a little studied implication is that these changes may undermine democratic accountability because voters are unable to determine which level of government to hold accountable for policy outcomes. This paper draws on the well-established parameters of the economic voting model; incumbent governments' are rewarded (punished) for good (bad) economic conditions. In the context of multi-level governance and changing patterns of authority, the ability of voters to successfully hold governments' accountable for economic conditions is likely to be undermined because they are unsure who is most responsible. This proposition will be tested using data from the 2001 British Election Study, which asked respondents: 'which of the following is most responsible for how Britain's economy has been doing: the British government, the European Union or both?' If voters are able to successfully hold the British government accountable, economic voting should be strongest amongst respondents who believe that the British government is most responsible for Britain's economy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Details

Language :
English
Database :
Academic Search Index
Journal :
Conference Papers -- American Political Science Association
Publication Type :
Conference
Accession number :
26944383