Intelligence Reform: The Pentagon v. Congress.

Two of the most significant developments in the U.S. national security landscape since 9/11 have been the increase in size, budget and responsibility of the Special Operations Forces on the one hand, and the movement for reform of the intelligence community on the other. This paper seeks to investigate the largely unexplored intersection of these two trends and how they are reacting to one another. The White House and the Pentagon have designated Special Operations Forces (SOF) as the lead organization in the ?war on terror.? However, as they have gotten more involved in fighting terrorism, SOF have become increasingly active in intelligence and direct action operations (manhunts, for example) that have traditionally been the CIA?s bailiwick under the rubric of ?covert action?, where the key factor is that the U.S. role in the operation is unacknowledged. Beyond triggering the predictable bureaucratic turf battles, this has effectively meant a decrease in congressional oversight since that system?s rules are somewhat vague and have been interpreted by the Pentagon as applying to the CIA but not to the military as it prosecutes the war on terror.At the same time, the intelligence failures of 9/11 and the nonexistent Iraqi WMD created a broad consensus on the need for intelligence reform. Among the various reform proposals, there has been a consistent call for stronger congressional oversight of intelligence and covert action decisions. Nonetheless, when Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act in December 2004, one aspect that was notably absent was any substantive strengthening of Congress?s oversight authority. There is some evidence, however, that after several years of turning a blind eye to the Pentagon?s growing intelligence role, Congress is finally beginning to reassert itself in the oversight arena. At the same time, though, the Pentagon has been busy developing a variety of new classifications of programs that by definition do not have to be reported to Congress but under which it can conduct operations that, if they were conducted by the CIA, would be called covert action (and thus would be subject to congressional oversight). It seems, therefore, that the Pentagon is managing to remain two steps ahead of Congress in keeping the military?s most sensitive programs out of its view. This paper will analyze the congressional committees? halting efforts at strengthening oversight and the reasons improving oversight has proven so difficult, and the Pentagon?s creative ways of avoiding oversight. Additionally, it will elucidate why SOF?s involvement in intelligence causes particular problems for congressional oversight since it inherently involves both the intelligence and defense committees. Finally, the paper will conclude with recommendations on how to improve oversight in this new era of SOF-dominated intelligence. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]