Is Theory Responsible for Practice?

This paper begins with the argument that at a basic level ?theory? and ?practice? are inseparable, yet differing, ideal-type expressions of knowledge. While theory is intrinsically practical because words and reasons are actions and causes, practice is inherently theoretical because actions and causes are forms of theory, too. When we distinguish between theory and practice, therefore, this is not on the grounds of their ontological or epistemological status, but our instrumental interests: theory and practice serve differing purposes, and we value their usefulness accordingly. Thus, while theory is clearly ?relevant? for practice and vice versa, another question becomes more important: Is theory also ?responsible? for practice? For example, is Marxist (or Liberal) theory responsible for Marxist (or Liberal) practice? This paper argues that the (moral) responsibility of theory for practice is much more bounded than theory?s relevance for practice (and vice versa). Crucially, the paper suggests that while theory and theorist ?are? morally responsible for practice, we nonetheless should not necessarily ?hold? them morally responsible as well. In short, while there might not be a great divide between theory and practice in ontological or epistemological terms, this paper aims to defend the view that there is indeed a moral difference between theory and practice; and that the moral standing of theory for the sake of theory is worth defending. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]