Tying Hands and Cutting Slack: Comparing India?s Negotiating Positions in Agriculture and Services using the Two-Level Game Framework.

How states behave in the context of a negotiation can best be understood within a domestic-international framework such as two-level game which focuses on international and domestic-level inputs simultaneously and attempts to understand the strategic interaction between them. However, the literature on two-level games, with some exceptions, focuses primarily on bilateral negotiations between developed states. Studying developing country responses in the context of multilateral negotiations requires us to both modify certain assumptions and question some of the conclusions. The existing literature looks at cases where the negotiations are initiated by the executives of states engaged in the negotiations and thus assumes that at least at the agenda-setting phase, the executive has substantial autonomy. This paper, which compares the processes through which India?s negotiating agenda on agriculture and services were arrived at, focuses on negotiations, which were not initiated by the Indian executive but were mandated by the WTO. The very fact that the executive is responding to an international regime stirs up domestic political actors, including but not restricted to specific interest groups whose interests may be affected. India?s negotiating agenda in the two sectors were thus shaped simultaneously by international political and economic factors as well as domestic politics within India. Contrary to the literature?s finding that the executives prefer not to tie their hands, the Indian government made an explicit attempt to involve relevant stakeholders. The paper analyzes how such domestic-international interactions and the executive?s attempt at involving stakeholders have shaped India?s negotiating response and in process, suggests modifications in the two-level game framework. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]