Private Rights of Action to Enforce Rules of International Regimes.

This paper examines the costs and benefits of allowing private parties to bring claims--creating private rights of action--against states before an international forum to enforce violations of international law. The assessment concludes that while adding a private right of action to international enforcement mechanisms can have benefits, there are also potential costs that may be underappreciated. Perhaps the greatest benefit is enhanced compliance with international law, which could help realize greater benefits from cooperation. The increased constraint imposed on states by private rights of action, however, could lead states to resist compliance with regime rules, or to resist joining a regime in the first place. Various costs also could result from the reduced discretion of a more legalized enforcement mechanism. For example, in some situations it might be more effective in achieving compliance to take a cooperative approach, rather than an adversarial approach. The existence of these and other potential costs suggests that private rights of action are not unquestionably desirable. The balance of costs and benefits will depend on the institutional context. As an application of the cost-benefit analysis, the paper examines potential private rights of action in two regimes, the WTO and the Montreal Protocol noncompliance procedure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]