Role of Intelligence Synthesis in Political Decisions.

There is less untruth in saying that much of what intelligence agencies submit or prohibit is to suit the establishment plans which have already been made. Similarly there is more truth in the statement that most of what they provide and mark secret ?For Your Eyes Only? is already available with experts or open media and all of this is free. In the times of internet, access to such information has become much more easier. John F Kennedy once said ?There are no secrets except a few things I need to know.?The matters on which intelligence reports would be seriously considered are the intentions of the adversary. As per John F Gailbraith, ? You can not tell anything useful about the intentions of the govt that it does not know itself.? He called it as the Gailbraith?s First Law of Intelligence. He amplified that this is a normal situation of governments in conflict. As a general rule in modern times debates and discussions on all great decisions continue up to the moment of final decision and its implementation.. No one could have collected information of time , date and place of Normandy landings as the decision was not finalised till last couple of hours. There is another reason. Very often rapidly evolving military or political developments lead to particular situations which no one had intended earlier. Intelligence agencies could not be faulted for failing to predict the same. Was breakup of Pakistan in 1971 war between India and Pakistan intended as such.? One of the greatest fiasco for which CIA is blamed is failure to predict break up of USSR.The important and more possible task for all intelligence agencies is to provide what is called ?Essential Elements of Information (EEI). The synthesis is interpreting various pieces of information (EEI) to appreciate enemy capability and vulnerability. The synthesis can facilitate decision making and its protection safeguards national security. The purpose of this presentation is to analyze the synthesis submitted by intelligence, how much is real and how much to suit a particular political decision which has already been made. History has number of instances where ?manipulated? intelligence synthesis has brought misery and failure without giving any benefits to the aggressor. A study in Oct 04 by a British Medical Journal shows more than 1,00,000 Iraqi civilians have died. It is not failure of intelligence machinery as it is misuse of the same to justify a particular course of action .The key aspect of American case for year 2002 war was intelligence assessments to support the war on Iraq.s WMD programme. It is true that the CIA ethic is to ? call them as they see them.? It is also a fact that the agency works for the White House and that its Director serves at the pleasure of the President. During the constitutionally mandated State of the Union Address on 28 Jan 03 President Bush had stated, ? Our intelligence officials estimate that Saddam Hussain had the material to produce as much as 500 tons of sarin, mustard and VX nerve agent.? British Prime Minister told the MPs that according to intelligence reports Saddam Hussain had the capability to deploy his weapons of mass destruction in ?45 minutes? . This ?45 minutes? was crucial and it persuaded many MPs who were until then opposed to Britain involvement in any military on Iraq, to change their mind. A comprehensive 15 month search for WMD by Iraq Survey group (of USA) has concluded in Sep 04 ?no signs of illegal stockpiles that US and Britain presented as the justification for going to war nor did it find any evidence of efforts to reconstitute Iraq nuclear weapon programme?... ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]