Why Do Countries Commit to Human Rights Treaties?

At the dawn of the twenty-first century, hardly any aspect of state authority has been left untouched by international law. Yet despite the central importance of international treaties to international order, we still have much to learn about why treaties exist and why states join them. During the last decade, scholars have sought answers to these long-ignored questions and, in the process, have opened the door to a deeper understanding of the role of international law in shaping state behavior. This article aims to pry the door open even further by examining states’ decisions to commit to international human rights treaties. It makes several specific, testable predictions about state behavior. To take one example, it predicts that states with unlimited executive power and poor human rights records will be no less likely to commit to human rights treaties than states with unlimited executive power and good human rights records—because there is little prospect that the treaties will be enforced against the state. Conversely, it predicts that states with significant limits on executive power and poor human rights records will be less likely to commit to human rights treaties than other nations—precisely because they are the countries where the treaties are most likely to lead to changes in behavior. This and other predictions are put to the test using a quantitative analysis of the practices of more than 160 countries during a period of over 40 years. The article concludes by briefly considering how treaties should be designed to better achieve their goals in light of the findings and by briefly outlining several avenues for future research. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]