Trial Court Judicial Independence in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay.

Constitutionalism rests, explicitly or implicitly, on the assumption that the law and the courts that apply constitutions are to one degree or another autonomous from political actors, constituting a separate power center in the political system. This paper develops the concept and a general causal theory of judicial autonomy, building on and refining conceptual developments in the field. It then applies the concept and the theory to a series of national and sub-national courts in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. The paper reviews institutional design in each of the legal systems, canvasses expert opinion as to the degree of autonomy present in each, and explores the connection between institutional design and political context on the one hand, and judicial autonomy on the other. In addition to offering important conceptual clarification, the paper develops a theory of judicial autonomy and independence that can be applied across all judicial systems, collects data that are not otherwise widely available about the performance of these courts, and offers a comprehensive argument regarding the determinants of judicial autonomy in a variety of institutional and political configurations. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]