“Voting Correctly” in the 1999 European Parliament Election.

The average voter in European Parliament elections violates the normative ideals of democratic theory by being disinterested and uninformed. However, given the limitations of human cognition, the normative ideals of democratic theory are unrealistic. In this paper I use an alternative standard that suggests voters fulfill their democratic obligations if they "vote correctly." Using an operationalization of correct voting developed in experimental research and adapted for use in survey data, I compare actual votes to an objective determination of how the voter would have voted if they were fully informed about their own preferences. I calculate that 71 percent of European voters cast a correct vote in the 1999 European Parliament election, although there is considerable variation across the 15 member states. I also examine the individual determinates of correct voting and find little to no evidence for a "democratic deficit." Finally, I compare the allocation of seats in the Parliament based on actual and correct voting and find little difference. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]