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Against intentionalism.
- Source :
-
Philosophical Studies . Dec2007, Vol. 136 Issue 3, p279-304. 26p. 4 Diagrams. - Publication Year :
- 2007
-
Abstract
- Intentionalism is the claim that the phenomenological properties of a perceptual experience supervene on its intentional properties. The paper presents a counter-example to this claim, one that concerns visual grouping phenomenology. I argue that this example is superior to superficially similar examples involving grouping phenomenology offered by Peacocke ( Sense and Content, Oxford: Oxford University Press), because the standard intentionalist responses to Peacocke’s examples cannot be extended to mine. If Intentionalism fails, it is impossible to reduce the phenomenology of an experience to its content. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Subjects :
- *MODERN philosophy
*ACT psychology
*PSYCHOLOGY
*PHENOMENOLOGY
*CONSCIOUSNESS
Subjects
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 00318116
- Volume :
- 136
- Issue :
- 3
- Database :
- Academic Search Index
- Journal :
- Philosophical Studies
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 27605981
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-2013-2