Riding the Tiger: Nationalism, Diplomacy, and the Strategic Logic of Anti-Foreign Protest in China, 1978-2005.

Why does the Chinese government sometimes allow and sometimes suppress nationalist, anti-foreign demonstrations, and what are the consequences of this choice for China's international relations? I suggest that anti-foreign protests in authoritarian systems are like "audience costs," a source of bargaining leverage in diplomatic negotiations. The mechanism, however, is new. The risk that anti-foreign protests will turn against the government, combined with the escalating costs of making international concessions, enable authoritarian leaders to signal resolve and credibly claim that their hands are tied by domestic constraints. This finding has important implications for research on domestic politics and international relations, since it suggests a mechanism by which public opinion can influence the foreign policy of authoritarian regimes. I utilize a "natural experiment" to test the argument, comparing the occurrence of anti-Japanese protest over the period 1978-2005 in Hong Kong and mainland China, with Hong Kong serving as the control group. To further illustrate, I present a case study of the 2005 anti-Japanese protests in China and the negotiations over U.N. Security Council reform, drawing upon more than 100 interviews with nationalist activists, protest participants, and government officials in China, Japan and Hong Kong. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]